Economics of Development
Economics of Development
ISSN 1683-1942 e-ISSN 2304-6155 UDC 33
DOI: 10.63341/econ
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The independence of the Central Bank of the Republic of Guinea and its macroeconomic challenges

Ibrahim Ag Elmoctar, Fawaz A. Adéchinan Aminou, Mamoudou Bagaga, Mbaye Diene

Received 08.10.2025, Revised 19.02.2026, Accepted 26.03.2026 Published 09.04.2026

Abstract

This study examined the independence of the Central Bank of the Republic of Guinea and its relationship with macroeconomic stability over the period 2010-2024. The analysis was motivated by the increasing importance of credit monetary institution in supporting price stability and macroeconomic management in developing economies. To capture the multidimensional nature of central bank independence, the study constructed a composite index combining de jure and de facto indicators, as well as measures of institutional transparency. The empirical analysis relied on an econometric framework complemented by robustess checks to access the association between central bank independence and key macroeconomic indicators. The results suggest that a higher levels of central bank independence are associated with lower inflation and relatively more stable growth dynamics. However, the explanatory power of the estimated models remains limited, which calls for cautions interpretation of these results. Rather than providing strong evidence of a direct causal impact on economic growth, the findings indicated that independence may contribute to macroeconomic stability primarily through a credibility and expectation-anchoring channel. In this perspective, the role of central bank independence appears to be more stabilising than expansionary. The analysis also highlighted a gap between statutory provisions and their effective implementation, suggesting that legal reforms alone may not fully translate into stronger monetary credibility. Effective governance practices, institutional transparency, and clear communication strategies appear essential for strengthening the operational independence of the central bank. From a policy perspective, the results underline the importance of reinforcing institutional enforcement mechanisms and improving coordination between monetary and fiscal authorities in order to support a stable and predictable macroeconomic environment in Guinea


Keywords:

monetary policy; macroeconomic stability; inflation; institutional governance; transparency

https://doi.org/10.63341/econ/1.2026.17

Retrieved from Volume 25, No. 1, 2026

Pages 17-28

References Suggested citation

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Suggested citation

Elmoctar, I.A., Aminou, F.A.A., Bagaga, M., & Diene, M. (2026). The independence of the Central Bank of the Republic of Guinea and its macroeconomic challenges. Economics of Development, 25(1), 17-28. https://doi.org/10.63341/econ/1.2026.17